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APPENDIX 
This appendix contains: (1) a compilation of the relevant text from the UCC 
drafts referenced in the article; (2) an excerpt from the February 1999 AAMA letter 
to Chairman Bugge; and (3) the full text of the March 1999 memo from Chairman 
Bugge to the Article 2 drafting committee. 
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Section 2-201, January 1993 Draft 
SECTION 2-201. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS; STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
FOR CONSUMER CONTRACTS. 
(a) A contract or modification thereof under this Article, other than one for con-
sumer goods, is enforceable whether or not there is a writing signed or a symbol 
authenticated by a party against whom enforcement is sought or the contract or mod-
ification is not capable of performance within one year of its making. 
 
(b) A contract for the sale of consumer goods for the price of $50 or more is not 
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is a writing or symbol that is 
sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties, that 
describes the goods sold and that is signed or authenticated by the party against 
whom enforcement is sought . . . 
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SECTION 2-201, JULY 1994 DRAFT 
SECTION 2-201. NO FORMAL REQUIREMENTS.  
A contract . . . is enforceable, whether or not there is a writing signed or a record 
authenticated by a party against whom enforcement is sought, even if the contract . . 
. is not capable of performance within one year after its making. 
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WARRANTIES 
Section 2-313, January 1993 Draft 
SECTION 2-313. EXPRESS WARRANTIES BY AFFIRMATION, 
PROMISE, DESCRIPTION, SAMPLE. 
(a) Subject to subsection (b), any affirmation of fact or promise made by the 
seller to the buyer or to the public that relates to the goods, or any description or any 
sample or model of the goods of which the buyer has knowledge at the time of con-
tracting or thereafter, becomes part of the bargain and creates an express warranty 
that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise or the description, sample 
or model. 
 
(b) If the seller proves by clear and affirmative evidence that the buyer was un-
reasonable in concluding that the affirmation, promise, description or sample was 
part of the bargain, no express warranty is made. 
 
(c) To create an express warranty under subsection (a), it is not necessary that 
the seller use formal words, such as “warrant” or “guarantee”, or have a specific 
intention to make a warranty. However, an affirmation merely of the value of the 
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion or commendation 
of the goods does not create a warranty. 
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Section 2-313, July 1994 Draft 
SECTION 2-313. EXPRESS WARRANTIES BY AFFIRMATION, 
PROMISE, DESCRIPTION, SAMPLE. 
. . . 
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a description, affirmation of 
fact, or promise made by a seller, including a manufacturer, to the public which re-
lates to goods to be sold presumptively creates an express warranty to any buyer that 
the goods will conform to the description, affirmation, or promise. Subject to Section 
2-318, the buyer may enforce the express warranty directly against the seller, 
whether or not the express warranty is part of the contract with the buyer’s immediate 
seller. 
(d) An express warranty is not created under subsection (c) if the seller estab-
lishes that the description, affirmation of fact, or promise: 
(1) was made more than a reasonable time before or after the sale; 
(2) was made to a segment of the public of which the buyer was not a part; or 
(3) resulted from a mistake upon which the buyer did not reasonably rely. 
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Section 2-313, July 1996 Draft 
SECTION 2-313. EXPRESS WARRANTIES. 
. . .  
(c) Any affirmation of fact, promise, description, sample or model made or pro-
vided under subsection (b) becomes part of the agreement unless the seller estab-
lishes that a reasonable person in the position of the immediate buyer would either 
believe otherwise or believe that any affirmation, promise, or statement made was 
merely of the value of the goods or purported to be merely the seller’s opinion or 
commendation of the goods. 
(d) If the seller makes an affirmation of fact or promise relating to or a descrip-
tion of goods to a remote buyer or lessee through an authorized dealer or other inter-
mediary of the seller or through any medium of communication to the public, includ-
ing advertising, the following rules apply: 
 
(1) An obligation is created if the remote buyer or lessee establishes that it knew 
of and was reasonable in believing that the goods purchased from another seller or 
lessor in the distributive chain would conform to the affirmation of fact, promise or 
description made by the seller; 
 
(2) The obligation may be enforced by the remote buyer or lessee as an express 
warranty directly against the seller under this [article] . . . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6
Barry Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 7
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol23/iss2/7
Spring 2018 Commercial Sellers vs. Consumer Buyers Appendix 105 
 
Section 2-403, July 1999 Draft 
SECTION 2-403. EXPRESS WARRANTY TO IMMEDIATE BUYER. 
(a) Any representation made by the seller to the immediate buyer . . . which 
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express 
warranty that the goods will conform to the representation or, with respect to a sam-
ple or model, that the whole of the goods will conform to the sample or model. 
. . . 
 
(c) A representation under subsection (a) becomes part of the basis of the bargain 
unless:  
 
(1) the immediate buyer knew that the representation was not true;  
 
(2) a reasonable person in the position of the immediate buyer would not believe 
that the representation was part of the agreement; or  
 
(3) in the case of a representation made in any medium of communication to the 
public, including advertising, the immediate buyer did not know of the representa-
tion at the time of the sale. 
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DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES 
Section 2-316(b)(2), January 1993 Draft 
SECTION 2-316. EXCLUSION OR MODIFICATION OF WARRANTIES. 
. . .  
(2) In contracts for the sale of consumer goods: 
 
[Alt. A] Any agreement disclaiming or limiting the implied warranty of mer-
chantability is inoperative. 
 
[Alt. B] If the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act applies, any agreement disclaim-
ing or limiting the implied warranty of merchantability is inoperative. 
 
[Alt. C] Any agreement disclaiming or limiting the implied warranty of mer-
chantability is inoperative, unless the seller proves by clear and convincing evidence 
that the buyer was aware of and understood the clause. 
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Section 2-316(e), July 1994 Draft 
SECTION 2-316. EXCLUSION OR MODIFICATION OF WARRANTIES. 
. . .  
(e) In a consumer contract, terms disclaiming or limiting the implied warranty 
of merchantability or the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose must be 
in a writing or record. The terms are inoperative unless the seller proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that the buyer understood and expressly agreed to the term. 
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Section 2-316(b)(2), July 1996 Draft 
SECTION 2-316. EXCLUSION OR MODIFICATION OF WARRANTIES. 
. . .  
(e) Terms in a consumer contract excluding or modifying the implied warranty 
of merchantability or the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose must be 
contained in a record and be conspicuous. [The terms are inoperative unless the 
seller establishes by clear and affirmative evidence that the buyer expressly 
agreed to them.] 
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UNCONSCIONABILITY 
Section 2-105, January 1993 Draft 
§ 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause. 
(a) [1] If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse 
to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscion-
able clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to 
avoid any unconscionable result. 
 
(b) If the court as a matter of law finds that a consumer contract or any clause of 
such contract has been induced by unconscionable conduct or that unconscionable 
conduct has occurred in the collection of a claim arising from the consumer contract, 
the court may grant appropriate relief. 
. . .  
(d) In an action in which a party claims unconscionability with respect to a con-
sumer contract: 
 
(1) If the court finds unconscionability under subsection (a) or (b), the court shall 
award reasonable attorney’s fees to the consumer. 
 
(2) If the court does not find unconscionability and the consumer claiming un-
conscionability has brought or maintained an action known to be groundless, the 
court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees to the party against whom the claim is 
made. 
 
(3) In determining attorney’s fees, the amount of recovery on behalf of the claim-
ant under subsections (a) and (b) is not controlling. 
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Section 2-302, December 1994 Draft 
SECTION 2-302. UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT OR CLAUSE. 
(a) If a court finds as a matter of law that a contract or any clause thereof was 
unconscionable at the time it was made or was induced by unconscionable conduct, 
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder of the contract 
without the unconscionable clause, or so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid an unconscionable result. 
 
(b) Before making a finding of unconscionability under subsection (a), the court, 
on motion of a party or its own motion, shall afford the parties a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the contract or 
clause thereof or of the conduct. 
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Section 2-105, July 1999 Draft 
SECTION 2-105. UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT OR TERM. 
(a) If a court as a matter of law finds a contract or any term thereof to have been 
unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, 
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or it may so 
limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable re-
sult. 
 
(b) In a consumer contract, a nonnegotiated term in a standard form record is 
unconscionable and not enforceable if it: 
 
(1) eliminates the essential purpose of the contract; 
 
(2)  subject to Section 2-202, conflicts with other material terms to which the 
parties have expressly agreed, or 
 
(2) imposes manifestly unreasonable risk or cost on the consumer in the cir-
cumstances. 
 
(c) If a court as a matter of law finds that a consumer contract or any term thereof 
has been induced by unconscionable conduct or that unconscionable conduct has 
occurred in the collection of a claim arising from the consumer contract, the court 
may grant appropriate relief. 
 
(d) If it is claimed or appears to the court that a contract or any term thereof may 
be unconscionable, the parties must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present 
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making 
the determination. 
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EXCERPT FROM AAMA LETTER TO LARRY BUGGE (FEBRUARY 4, 1999) 
The revision of Article 2 should be fair and balanced – it should both protect 
parties from unfair surprise and unreasonable terms and facilitate commerce and 
safeguard the sanctity of contract.  The revision also should clarify points of conten-
tion in current law and address new technologies and methods of doing business. 
Unfortunately, although the drafting committee has been hard at work for well over 
six years and some progress toward these goals has been made, current Article 2 is 
still the superior product.  We therefore oppose the Article 2 revision in its current 
form and urge the drafting committee and the Conference to reconsider their goal of 
completing the project this spring. 
 
We cannot support the adoption of draft Article 2 for several reasons: 
• First, many substantive provisions in the draft are not fair and bal-
anced. 
• Second, the draft still contains needless and unjustified alterations 
of existing law, consisting either of non-substantive language 
changes or of substantive changes that do not address real problems 
in existing Article 2 or do not reflect new technologies and methods. 
• Third, many revised sections, which have not been studied for sev-
eral years, contain coordination, clarity, and conceptual problems, 
and therefore are not ready for adoption. 
• Fourth, the reporters have only recently introduced embryonic 
drafts of official comments that will play a crucial role in the judicial 
development of the revised sales law.  These early efforts are not 
encouraging; the draft comments sometimes obfuscate or fail to re-
flect written rules and, at other times, appear to retract painstaking 
compromises made at drafting committee meetings. This much is 
clear -- much work remains to be done. 
• Finally, revised Article 2 is still far from achieving coordination 
with other NCCUSL drafting projects. For example, the drafters 
have indicated that many sections of the Article 2 draft “will follow” 
proposed UCC Article 2B. Revised Article 2 should not be adopted 
until the drafters determine what Article 2B ultimately will look 
like. 
14
Barry Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 7
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol23/iss2/7
Spring 2018 Commercial Sellers vs. Consumer Buyers Appendix 113 
TEXT OF MEMORANDUM FROM LARRY BUGGE TO ARTICLE 2 DRAFTING 
COMMITTEE 
Memorandum 
To: Article 2 Drafting Committee 
CC: Reporters 
From: Lawrence J. Bugge 
Date:   March 10, 1999 
Re:  Executive Session Agenda 
As you know from the meeting materials you have or soon will receive, I have 
scheduled an executive session of the Committee, without observers, for 7:45 am 
on Friday March 5.  A continental breakfast will be available. This memo is in-
tended to explain the reason and agenda for that meeting. 
 
This is the last scheduled meeting of the Drafting Committee.  We are scheduled 
to present a final draft for approval by the ALI at its meeting in May, and to the 
Conference in July.  As all of us are keenly aware, there is still a great deal of con-
troversy and opposition to some of the provisions of the draft among industry ob-
servers and the organizations they represent.  It appears unlikely that we can convert 
these interested parties to supporters of the project, but it may be possible to reduce 
or even to neutralize their opposition by making some changes in the draft. Without 
some movement in that direction, many major industries will actively oppose enact-
ment of revised Article 2, which will likely prevent wholesale or at least uniform 
adoption of the Article, since unlike Article 2B, it has few if any strong supporters. 
 
During the last Drafting Committee meeting, and since, and with my knowledge 
and encouragement, two members of our Committee, Boris Auerbach and Bill Hen-
ning, had some informal discussions with several of the observers who represent 
industries that have been our most consistent critics. The observers participating 
were Andy Koblenz, Charlie Keeton, and Bob Hillman.  The purpose of the discus-
sions was to try to determine what further changes in the draft would be necessary 
and sufficient for their clients to withdraw active opposition to enactment of revised 
Article 2 in the legislatures.  A list of issues was developed and presented to Boris 
and Bill and passed on to me, the Conference leadership and the Reporters. All of 
these issues are also presented in Keeton’s latest letter to the Committee dated March 
8, a copy of which you have or will soon receive.  The letter makes no reference to 
the discussions mentioned above. 
 
I initiated a conference call today with Koblenz, Keeton, and Hillman to review 
their objections and to confirm that these issues represented their clients’ ‘‘bottom 
15
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line.” They assured me that if all (and probably if most) of these objections are re-
solved, their clients would take a neutral position on enactment.  They also acknowl-
edged that opposition from other allied quarters, especially NAM, had been “influ-
enced” by their clients’ positions, and would likely also be neutralized if their clients’ 
concerns are addressed. 
 
I have listed below, in no particular order, the issues that we discussed and the 
changes industry wants.  In most cases, I have also indicated my own reaction and 
recommendation, and in some casesO [sic] the position of the Reporters.  Some of 
the changes requested have already been addressed in the March 1 draft. 
1. 2-201 Statute of Frauds — return to existing law: part perfor-
mance should satisfy the statute only to the extent of goods delivered 
and accepted. Admissions satisfy the statute only if the formation of 
a contract is admitted, not if just facts from which a contract may be 
found.  I would support the first change but not the second. 
2. 2-202 Parol Evidence — they would prefer present law and at 
least use of “consistent additional terms” rather than “non-contra-
dictory” terms as the draft provides, and restoring the comments we 
brought up into the statute back in comments.  I am rather indifferent 
to these changes, and I don’t think these are one of their major is-
sues. 
3. Electronic contracting — while earlier indicating that they pre-
ferred the “minimalist” approach the committee adopted at its last 
meeting, GE at least now supports following Art. 2B on these pro-
visions.  See Keeton letter, p. 6.  At last week’s conformity meeting 
the recommendation of the group including me and our reporters is 
that Art. 2 do just that.  While these provisions may ultimately be 
placed in Art. 1, they now must appear separately in each of the 2’s 
because they will be adopted at different times. 
4. 2-206 Unenforceable terms in Consumer Contracts — they pre-
fer elimination of this provision in the text and at most treating it in 
a comment to the Unconscionability Section 2-105.  The ALI ad hoc 
committee chaired by Justice Peters also seems to favor relocation 
of this issue to 2-105, but probably in the text rather than a comment.  
As to this and the following one, I think a comment would suffice, 
along the lines of Fred Miller’s suggested draft, attached.  The re-
porters disagree. 
5. 2-207(d) Gateway Problem — they would prefer to leave this 
problem to the courts, but I sense this is not a major issue for these 
observers and their clients. It is for Gateway itself, however, as the 
parade of contract professor condemnations they elicited attests.  I 
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think this too could be better, and less controversially, addressed in 
a comment to 2-105. The reporters disagree. 
6. 2-207 (a)-(c) Battle of the Forms — as I understand their posi-
tion, they would like to give effect to “additional terms” that appear 
in a form containing a “my way or the highway” clause when the 
other party’s form is silent as to the additional terms and does not 
contain its own “highway” clause.  In such circumstances, the sec-
ond party’s silence would not operate as a knockout, leaving the 
parties to gap-fillers.  I and the reporters oppose this change because 
it would reward the sophisticated and punish the party whose form 
was incorrectly drafted.  
7. 2-209 Modification — they want to eliminate tOhe [sic] ban on 
NOM clauses in consumer contracts and restore the application of 
the Statute of Frauds if the modification takes the contract over the 
$5,000 threshold. The reporters, Ellen Peters, and I do not oppose 
these changes. 
8. 2-403 Express Warranties — they want the “basis of the bar-
gain” language to read “if” rather than its present formulation that 
representations become part of the “basis of the bargain” unless cer-
tain conditions are met.  The reporters, Fred Miller and I would op-
pose this change.  They also wanted a comment to make that the 
creation of express warranties is subject to the Parole Evidence 
Rule. Such a comment has been added in Comment 2. Finally, they 
appear to want some indication in the text that “basis of the bargain” 
implies that some reliance must be found before representations 
made through advertising rise to the level of an express warranty. I 
would oppose such an addition. 
9. 2-404 Denny case comment — they would like the lead-in lan-
guage to the comment we negotiated with the ALI to be clarified. 
This has been done.  
10. 2-406 Ban on Disclaimer of Merchantability in Consumer Con-
tracts — Alternative B to (c)(1) is language for the 10 states or so 
that currently preclude such disclaimers.  The observers don’t  want 
to highlight this option by showing it in the text; as in Article 9 we 
could show the suOggested [sic] language in an appendix or at most 
in a comment.  I have no objection to either approach, but it should 
be noted that at its October meeting the ALI Council voted 34-3 in 
a sense of the house motion that there should be some implied war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness that should not be disclaima-
ble. 
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11. 2-407(3) Conflict of Warranties — this section provides that 
“except in a consumer contract” express warranties displace implied 
warranties.  They object to the quoted language which the commit-
tee removed in Dallas, but which was restored at the request of Prof. 
Elizabeth Warren of the ALI Council. The reporters and I would not 
object to the deletion of the exception, especially since Magnuson-
Moss probably precludes the disclaimer effect anyway. 
12. 2-408 Pass through warranty to remote buyers — they want a 
clarification in text or comment that “good sold as new goods” 
would not cover goods sold by discounters or in a gray market out-
side the normal chain of distribution. This is not objectionable, and 
Comment 2 to the section may already sufficiently address this is-
sue. They also want to clarify that an intermediate commercial 
buyer, such as a distributor, does not get the pass-through warranty 
intended for the ultimate user. 
13. 2-409 Horizontal extension of warranties — Sub (a) precludes 
the disclaimer or limitation of this warranty for non-personal injury 
damages, ‘‘unless the seller has a substantial interest” in limiting the 
warranty to the immediate buyer.  They object to this limitation in 
property damage situations.  The reporters and I have no objection 
to its deletion. 
14. 2-102(23) Remedial Promise — they want it made clear that the 
term does not apply to service contracts, that it essentially refers to 
a “repair, replace or refund” alternate remedy, and the language re-
ferring to the obligation to act arising on the “happening of a speci-
fied future event” be clarified or eliminated. They also want it made 
clear that breach of a remedial promise to repair does not revive an 
expired statute of limitations that bars an action for breach of the 
contract.  The reporters and I do not object. 
15. 2-704 Buyer’ use of properly rejected goods — lf the buyer is 
forced to used non- conforming goods in order to mitigate damages, 
they believe he should also be liable not only for the value of the 
use, but also for the “capital loss” arising from the fact that the seller 
can no longer resell them as “new” goods. This is a difficult issue to 
capture legislatively, and perhaps it could be addressed in a com-
ment. 
16. 2-103 Scope and exclusion of software — the concern is that 
Art. 2 should not apply to software, unless it is imbedded software 
included with the sale of the goods. The revised section worked out 
with the 2B people last weekend probably answers their concerns. 
18
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17. 2-402 Warranty of title and against infringement — the general 
14-year statute of limitations does not begin to run on this warranty 
until discovery of the breach. They have no problem with this result 
in the case of title (because of the common law rule on stolen goods), 
but are concerned with its application to infringement claims which 
could extend indefinitely. They did not have a specific suggestion 
except for the usual 4-year statute. 
18. 2-606(a) Tender of delivery and installation — they suggest that 
the last sentence in the section regarding assembly and installation 
of the goods confuses the formerly simple default rule that tender of 
payment and delivery of the goods had to be simultaneous.  Perhaps 
a comment would clarify the perceived ambiguity. 
19. “Needless Tinkering” they insist that their frequently expressed 
concern about deviation from current Art. 2 language is genuine, 
and they seek to meet with the reporters and chair to resolve non-
substantive departures from existing text. I have no objection, but 
probably such a meeting could not occur until after the ALI meeting. 
 
I propose to discuss these matters in our executive session, but to take no votes 
there. I will then assign them to the agenda to be taken up in open session and vote 
on, probably on Saturday. so that the committee members will have time to discuss 
and debate these issues with each other and such observers as will listen. 
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